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Search and Seizure in 2004 — 
Dialogue or Dead-End? 
Alan Young* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Four recent cases leave a haunting impression that section 8 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) has had little impact upon 
policing in Canada. In October 2004, in R. v. Calderon,1 the Ontario 
Court of Appeal excluded drugs seized upon a warrantless search of a 
vehicle and trunk. The grounds for the search were based upon a 
“smuggler’s profile” which was satisfied upon the discovery of fast food 
wrappers, a cell phone, a map and a duffel bag found in plain view in 
the car. In addition, the police believed that the car was too expensive 
for this driver and this served to confirm their suspicion that the driver 
was a drug courier. Not only did the profile of “neutral indicators” uti-
lized by the police fall short of reasonable and probable grounds, but 
these officers had already employed this profile on dozens of occasions 
with no success in uncovering contraband. Perhaps it may be said that 
the Court of Appeal saved the day by excluding this evidence, but one 
has to wonder how it is still possible for police officers to mistakenly 
assume that a weakly-grounded intuition or hunch can constitute rea-
sonable and probable grounds.  
Admittedly, constitutional norms are stated at a high level of gener-
ality and there will always be some doubt and ambiguity with respect to 
the scope of protection of any particular Charter right. However, ambi-
guity at the periphery does not mean that there does not exist a core 
meaning for the right with definable content. The Calderon case sug-
gests that the core meaning of section 8 has been lost on law enforce-
ment officials, and three other recent cases fuel this fear. On January 24, 
2005, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal excluded $55,000 seized from 
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the accused when the police had no grounds to support their belief that 
this money represents proceeds of crime.2 On January 25, 2005, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal excluded cocaine seized from the accused after 
the police frisked the accused in the area of the groin during an investi-
gative detention.3 Finally, on January 28, 2005, a settlement was reached 
in a case in British Columbia in which a driver was randomly stopped 
for the purposes of a drug search by a state trooper from Texas who was 
working in Canada to educate the RCMP about the operation of the 
Texas Troopers’ profiling program.4  
The violations in these four cases are so obvious and self-evident 
that they lead to the conclusion that there has been an ineffective incor-
poration of constitutional norms within Canadian police culture. It is a 
mistake to assume that constitutional rulings are self-executing, and it is 
very surprising that nearly 25 years after the enactment of the Charter 
little empirical work has been done in Canada to measure the impact of 
constitutional rights and the rate and success of implementation of vari-
ous constitutional entitlements. American scholars have realized the 
importance of studying the “law in action”, and not just the “law on the 
books” and have produced empirical studies examining the impact of 
the Miranda right to counsel warnings and the impact of the fourth 
amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure.5  
Without any extensive studies having been conducted in Canada 
with respect to the implementation of Supreme Court Charter decisions, 
we can only speculate whether or not the police are trying to live up to 
the constitutional obligations imposed upon them by the Court. Alt-
hough some studies have been conducted, most of the studies have tend-
ed to be largely anecdotal or impressionistic. Despite the methodological 
shortcomings of these studies, some believe there are preliminary indica-
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tions that the police are prepared to modify their practices to accommo-
date the Supreme Court’s vision of the Charter: 
The police have managed to cope with new requirements imposed by 
the Charter and have effectively implemented changes to standard 
procedures. Although these changes may not constitute “tidal waves 
and earthquakes” the Charter has clearly had an indelible impact on 
police forces and on the formal and informal relationships between 
police and government organizations. Supreme Court Charter 
decisions have required police to look for support outside the police 
force and have pressured government organizations to reassess their 
responsibilities to the police. Police forces have generally been able to 
adapt to most “adverse” decisions by altering investigative methods 
and procedures, and where necessary, by abandoning some practices 
which previously had not been improper. The Metropolitan Toronto 
Police continually and strenuously strive to ensure that all officers are 
made aware of their Charter obligations.6 
........... 
Police forces have generally been able to adapt to most “adverse” 
decisions by altering investigative methods and procedures, and, 
where necessary, by abandoning some practices which previously had 
not been improper. The Metropolitan Toronto Police continually and 
strenuously are made aware of their Charter obligations.7 
This optimistic assessment of institutional compliance is undercut 
by the fact that trial and appellate court intervention is still necessary to 
correct clear-cut and obvious violations of rights. The need for empirical 
studies is also underscored by the fact that pre-Charter scholarship sug-
gests systemic police disregard for cumbersome legal requirements 
relating to search warrants. The Law Reform Commission of Canada 
reported in 1981 that 58.9 per cent of search warrants were invalidly 
issued (as based on a national average with some jurisdictions showing 
consistent compliance and others dismally failing).8 Initial indications in 
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the post-Charter era are not encouraging. In an informal survey con-
ducted in 1995 by Mr. Justice Casey Hill of the Ontario Court (General 
Division), it was found that 39 per cent of search warrants were invalid-
ly issued.9 More recently, a more systematic review concluded that “the 
current study, like those which preceded it, identified a disturbingly 
pronounced gulf between law and practice. In effect, 69% of the court 
orders in this study ought not to have been issued.”10 Although there is 
unlikely a causal connection, it is ironic (or perhaps tragic) that non-
compliance with legal requirements pertaining to search warrants has 
apparently increased since the passage of the Charter. 
In light of the evidence of systematic disregard of legal require-
ments for a search warrant and the evidence of a low rate of exclusion 
for section 8 violations, it is not a giant leap to tentatively conclude that 
privacy is meekly protected in Canada. On the surface, the Supreme 
Court has left the impression that it has taken an expansive and progres-
sive approach to the protection of privacy. Since 2000, the Court has 
declared that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents 
of a bus locker11 and the contents of a stolen safe found by the police.12 
It has also provided greater protection against strip searches13 and issued 
restrictive guidelines for searches of a lawyer’s office.14 More im-
portantly, unlike many of the hollow section 8 triumphs of the 1990s,15 
in these later cases the Court has actually excluded non-conscriptive 
evidence seized as a result of an unreasonable search. Despite this recent 
track record, the section 8 rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2004 support my assertion that privacy is meekly protected.  
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In R. v. Tessling,16 the Court held that surveillance of a private home 
by a Forward Looking Infra-Red device (FLIR) did not constitute a 
search as it did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. In R. v. 
Mann,17 the Court upheld the power of search upon investigative deten-
tion but excluded the seized evidence ruling that the search exceeded the 
bounds of the limited, protective search incident to detention. There is a 
common theme linking these two disparate cases. Both cases fail with 
respect to the fundamental objective of providing effective control of 
police discretion. Tessling lets the police make the decision whether 
new technology can invade the privacy of the home, and Mann provides 
power with little indication of how to exercise this power. As La Forest 
J. noted in 1986, the police “need the clearest possible rules” for the 
courts to be able to “exercise any effective control over the exercise of 
police discretion”18 If the police are not provided with clear guidelines 
for the practical implementation of a constitutional right there is a strong 
likelihood the right will be disregarded or circumvented.  
Reasonable people may disagree with the results of a particular de-
cision but a neutral evaluation of the merits of the decision can be made 
on the basis of determining whether the Court has issued a decision 
which is clear, comprehensive and internally coherent. Without these 
qualities, the decision will never be able to do anything beyond resolv-
ing the very dispute presented in the individual case. The objective of 
constitutional adjudication should be to reduce future litigation and not 
increase legal conflict by issuing decisions that raise more questions 
than they answer. It has proven difficult for the judiciary to wholly 
abandon its traditional role of adjudicating a specific dispute and begin 
focusing on the broader legislative or policy implications of the dispute. 
Not only must the decision guide and direct law enforcement officials 
but it must also provide the legislative branch of government with a 
clear direction as to its respective role in developing effective public 
policy for the administration of criminal justice.  
In our constitutional regime, judicial activism does not simply mean 
that the judiciary has hijacked the development of public policy. It has 
the more subtle meaning of the judiciary prompting and shaping the fu-
ture direction of criminal justice policy. The Supreme Court has spoken of 
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this constitutional dynamic as a “dialogue”.19 To ensure the dialogue is 
meaningful and well-informed, it is important that the judiciary recog-
nizes that it lacks the competence and authority to create an elaborate set 
of rules and that its activist role should be restricted to the initiation of a 
“dialogue” which can compel government to take corrective, legislative 
steps. The emerging notion of a constitutional dialogue has had its most 
vibrant application in the area of criminal justice. As Professor 
Stribopoulos has noted: 
This dialogue has frequently played itself out in the criminal procedure 
context. While in the past, Parliament has been reluctant to amend the 
Criminal Code to implement recommendations made by the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, it has been quick to respond with 
legislative reform whenever its hand has been forced by the Charter 
decisions of the Supreme Court. In circumstances where the Court has 
held that a particular investigative power of practice was 
unconstitutional, either because it lacked the necessary legal authority, 
or because its enabling legislation did not meet minimum Charter 
requirements, a legislative response has usually been forthcoming 
from Parliament. The legislation has typically refined the investigative 
power involved “to build in civil libertarian safeguards that meet the 
requirements of the Charter as set out by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.” This dynamic has been embraced by the Court, which has 
maintained that the reciprocal institutional review that it entails has 
“the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying it.”20 
The troubling feature of both the Tessling and Mann cases is that 
they do not contain the seeds of dialogue. Ruling that FLIR does not 
constitute a search provides no incentive for Parliament to review and 
assess the need for regulating this technology and related technological 
developments. By affirming the existence of the powers of investigative 
detention and search incident to detention the Court has left the mistak-
en impression that the judiciary has fully resolved the contours of this 
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new power with no need for legislative intervention. These cases do not 
trigger dialogue ― they are dead-end decisions leading nowhere for the 
development of criminal justice policy. They trigger silence by creating 
the mistaken impression that the problem has been solved and the issue 
resolved.  
II. TESSLING, TECHNOLOGY AND THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME 
Upon receiving tips from two informants, the police commenced an 
investigation into a suspected hydroponic marijuana grow operation 
involving Tessling. Hydro records did not confirm the presence of in-
creased consumption, so the police chartered a plane to fly over the 
Tessling property. The plane was equipped with a Forward Looking 
Infra-Red camera (FLIR) in order to conduct a “structure profile” of the 
property. FLIR will produce a picture or image of the thermal heat radi-
ating from the building. The police believed that the images of the heat 
patterns were consistent with a marijuana growing operation. Armed 
with the tips and inferences drawn from the FLIR images, the police 
obtained a warrant and upon entry they found weapons and a large 
quantity of marijuana.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the FLIR imaging violated a 
reasonable expectation of privacy thus requiring the police to obtain a 
warrant prior to entry.21 Although the court recognized that the imaging 
could not reveal any precise details of activity within the home and was 
a minimal intrusion upon “informational privacy”, the Court was reso-
lute in its conclusion that the targeting of a home to construct a profile 
of heat emanations was an intrusion into privacy. Madame Justice 
Abella stated: 
It is, it seems to me, overly simplistic to characterize the constitutional 
issue in this case as whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in heat emanating from a home. The surface emanations are, 
on their own, meaningless. But to treat them as having no relationship 
to what is taking place inside the home, is to ignore the stated purpose 
of their being photographed, that is, to attempt to determine what is 
happening inside the home. It would, I think, directly contradict the 
reasonable privacy expectations of most members of the public to 
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permit the state, without prior judicial authorization, to use infrared 
aerial cameras to measure heat coming from activities inside private 
homes as a way of trying to figure out what is going on inside.22 
The Court of Appeal asserted that the intrusion was significant and 
“almost Orwellian in its theoretical capacity”; however, the Supreme 
Court of Canada unanimously concluded that the intrusion was so insig-
nificant that it did not even engage the Constitution.23 The Court con-
cluded: 
For reasons already stated, I do not regard the use of current FLIR 
technology as the functional equivalent of placing the police inside the 
home. Nor is it helpful in the Canadian context to compare the state of 
technology in 2004 with that which existed at Confederation in 1867, 
or in 1982 when s. 8 of the Charter was adopted. Having regard to its 
purpose, I do not accept that s. 8 is triggered by a FLIR image that 
discloses that heat sources of some unknown description are present 
inside the structure, or that the heat distribution is uneven. Certainly 
FLIR imaging generates information about the home but s. 8 protects 
people, not places. The information generated by FLIR imaging about 
the respondent does not touch on “a biographical core of personal 
information,” nor does it “ten[d] to reveal intimate details of [his] 
lifestyle” (Plant, at p. 293). It shows that some of the activities in the 
house generate heat. That is not enough to get the respondent over the 
constitutional threshold.24 
Not only is it troubling that the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court employed highly divergent approaches to the concept of privacy, 
it is ironic that the Appellate Court took a more expansive approach in 
light of the fact that in the 1980s and 1990s the Appellate Courts were 
consistently overturned by the Supreme Court for adopting a rather 
parsimonious perspective on privacy. The Tessling decision is also puz-
zling because it seems so clearly inconsistent with the approach taken 
by the Supreme Court in earlier cases. There is little doubt that privacy 
is an elusive and malleable concept and reasonable disagreements over 
the scope of the right are inevitable. As the Supreme Court has stated: 
“expectation of privacy is a normative concept rather than a description 
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concept”,25 and in setting normative standards, courts will have to strug-
gle with the reality that privacy is a culturally-relative concept with few 
universal truths to assist in the development of the contours of the right. 
Privacy may be a protean concept, but there is a judicial consensus 
relating to two aspects of this right. First, from a western perspective, 
privacy is seen as a fundamental component of personhood and integral-
ly connected to self-fulfillment in a modern society. It has been said that 
privacy is as vital to modern living as “oxygen is for combustion”.26 
Second, it is recognized that technological developments pose the great-
est threat to privacy and it has been noted that “electronic surveillance is 
the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known”.27 As one commenta-
tor has recently mused: 
Technological devices in the hands of the government, however, are 
not an unmitigated blessing. Once again, the sword of technology has 
two razor-sharp edges. While one edge can be employed to preserve a 
nation’s security, the other can imperil its very essence. Constitutional 
freedoms that define our country and make it a bastion of liberty can 
be severely diminished, even destroyed, by uses and abuses of the 
tools of progress. The reality, or even the threat of, unregulated 
electronic monitoring can chill First Amendment freedoms of speech, 
press and association… Of greatest significance for present purposes, 
sophisticated eavesdropping equipment, electronic tracking devices, 
aerial surveillance, and other tools that dramatically improve upon 
human perceptual abilities and enable the government to hear, see, and 
otherwise learn matters the people seek and wish to keep confidential 
can eviscerate the precious assurance of privacy safeguarded by the 
Fourth Amendment right against “unreasonable searches.” What once 
were barriers to human senses are easily hurdled, and matters that 
were once inaccessible to those senses are brought within their reach 
by the products of innovation.28 
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Admittedly, FLIR does not engage as significant an intrusion as the 
electronic monitoring and recordings of conversations, but the question 
remains whether or not a free society will tolerate and accept the ran-
dom and unregulated use of any technology designed to assist police in 
locating and apprehending suspected criminals.  
Historically, rules and regulations pertaining to investigative 
searches were designed to protect property rights. The emergence of 
intrusive technology in the past century compelled a transformation of 
the approach to constitutional restrictions on search powers. In light of 
the increasing reliance upon wiretap, the United States Supreme Court 
in 1967 ruled that the prohibition on unreasonable searches was de-
signed to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy even when there is 
no intrusion upon property rights.29 In 1982 the Supreme Court of Cana-
da followed suit and held that section 8 of the Charter was designed to 
protect this reasonable expectation of privacy.30 There is no question that 
the reformulation of the right is responsive and necessary in light of the 
changing nature of law enforcement; however, moving from a concrete 
measure (i.e., intrusion onto property) to an abstract standard (privacy) 
would pose greater difficulties for the courts. Property rights are well-
defined whereas privacy often lies in the eye of the beholder. 
The American and Canadian Supreme Courts took very divergent 
approaches to this abstract issue. The American courts adopted an “as-
sumption of risk” approach in which a reasonable expectation of privacy 
would be limited by the extent to which private information was already 
vulnerable to detection by technological devices or by ordinary surveil-
lance. The American approach is based upon “the fallacious notion that 
privacy is an all or nothing proposition and that a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the government concerning infor-
mation partly exposed in a very limited way to a very limited group.”31 
For example, with respect to the installation of a tracking device to 
monitor the movements of a suspect in his car the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated: 
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A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another. When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling 
over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever 
stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited 
from public roads onto private property.32 
With respect to aerial surveillance of the backyard of a home, the 
Court stated: 
In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is 
routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana 
plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the 
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment 
simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at 
this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to 
the naked eye.33 
Ultimately, the approach of the American courts was so restrictive 
that one commentator concluded that: 
Anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the 
cellar, cloaking all windows with thick caulking, turning off all the 
lights and remaining absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not 
required in order to claim the benefit of the amendment because, if it 
were, the amendment’s benefit would be too stingy to preserve the 
kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the 
amendment is supposed to function. What kind of society is that? Is it 
one in which a homeowner is put to the choice of shuttering up his 
windows or of having a policeman look in?34 
In the early Charter-era, the appellate courts followed the restrictive 
American approach by reducing the expectation of privacy on ad hominen 
considerations and on the basis of the assumed risks of detection. For ex-
ample, the Ontario Court of Appeal was able to reach the counter-intuitive 
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conclusion that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a bath-
room stall at a public washroom because: 
In our opinion, the appellants had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The police surveillance established that this public washroom 
had become the meeting place for this group of men, to which both of 
the appellants appear to have adhered, for the practice of homosexual 
acts. The conduct probably offended s. 157 of the Criminal Code. That 
others would observe and recognize what was going on from the 
persistent use that these men made of the place was a risk that they 
undoubtedly understood. In the circumstances, by reason of their 
lookouts and precautions, perhaps they had an expectation that they 
would escape detention by the police or interference by the public. But 
that is not an expectation of privacy. This is not a case of persons 
resorting to the privacy of a closed cubicle in a public washroom for 
its expected use or for some personal indulgence that would be 
considered objectionable if carried on in public. On the contrary, the 
evidence, in the case of the appellant Mr. Lofthouse, allows no 
conclusion other than that the group intended to take over the public 
washroom as their meeting place so that they could engage in their 
activities without seeking the privacy of the closed toilet cubicles and, 
by reason of lookouts, without concern for interruption by others not 
members of their group. Mr. Lofthouse was very frank when he spoke 
of the privacy he expected as privacy “in the washroom” (not the 
closed cubicle) and “in the sense of privacy to a family” ― the 
group.35 
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada categorically rejected this 
American approach. In R. v. Duarte,36 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
police must obtain a warrant prior to conducting participant monitoring 
or a consent wiretap (where one of the parties to the conversation, usual-
ly a police informant, has consented to the monitoring and recording of 
the conversation). In 1971, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that participant monitoring did not engage the Constitution because the 
person being recorded assumed a risk that his or her audience would 
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disclose the information obtained to law enforcement officials.37 Our 
court frowned upon this “assumption of risk” approach stating that: 
Our perception that we are protected against arbitrary interceptions of 
private communications ceases to have any real basis once it is 
accepted that the state is free to record private communications, 
without constraint, provided only that it has secured the agreement of 
one of the parties to the communication. Since we can never know if 
our listener is an informer, and since if he proves to be one, we are to 
be taken to be tacitly consenting to the risk that the state may be 
listening to and recording our conversations, we should be prepared to 
run this risk every time we speak. I conclude that the risk analysis 
relied on by the Court of Appeal, when taken to its logical conclusion, 
must destroy all expectation of privacy.38 
The Court did not explicitly articulate a new approach to privacy but 
it is clear that the Court was most concerned with the fact that if the 
conclusion was reached that there did not exist a reasonable expectation 
of privacy this would mean that there would be no effective controls 
over the decision of the police to make permanent recordings of private 
communications: 
The reason for this protection is the realization that if the state were 
free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent electronic recordings of 
our private communications, there would be no meaningful residuum 
to our right to live our lives free from surveillance. The very efficacy 
of electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left 
unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications 
will remain private.39 
A few years later the Supreme Court had another opportunity to re-
nounce the “assumption of risk” approach to privacy.40 In Wong, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal reached another counter-intuitive conclusion in 
holding that there did not exist a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
hotel room being used for the purposes of illegal gambling. In reversing 
this holding, the Court provided some indication of the new approach to 
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be undertaken in assessing the impact of new technology on privacy. 
The Court stated: 
Accordingly, it follows logically from what was held in R. v. Duarte 
that it would be an error to suppose that the question that must be 
asked in these circumstances is whether persons who engage in illegal 
activity behind the locked door of a hotel room have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Rather, the question must be framed in broad 
and neutral terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours 
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
...unless the question is posed in neutral terms as I have suggested, it 
follows not only that those who engage in illegal activities in their 
hotel rooms must bear the risk of warrantless video surveillance, but 
also that all members of society when renting rooms must be prepared 
to court the risk that agents of the state may choose, at their sole 
discretion, to subject them to surreptitious surveillance.41 
Finally, in 1992 the Supreme Court hammered the final nail in the 
coffin of the “assumption of risk” approach. In R. v. Wise,42 the Court 
rejected the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court that employ-
ing a tracking device in a vehicle did not intrude upon privacy. Our 
Court recognized that unlike the audio recording in Duarte, and the 
video recording in Wong, the beeper monitor was “unsophisticated” and 
was merely a “rudimentary extension of physical surveillance”. None-
theless, the Court concluded that “an individual has a reasonable expec-
tation not only in the communications he makes, but in his movements 
as well.”43 The Court also noted that “the use of these types of tracking 
devices on automobiles poses important questions that ultimately have 
to be resolved by Parliament, and it would, I think, be helpful if this 
Court could provide some indication of the constitutionality of the use 
of electronic tracking devices.”44 
In approaching the elucidation of the privacy right and its impact on 
law enforcement, the Court in Wise was clearly anticipating that its 
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ruling would not be the final word, but rather a catalyst for legislative 
intervention. The “dialogue” theory of constitutional adjudication ani-
mated all of these privacy decisions. The dialogue between the judiciary 
and Parliament resulted in significant amendments to the Criminal Code 
as Parliament attempted to give expression to the constitutional de-
mands of the Court. The Borden case45 led to the enactment of the DNA 
warrant provisions (section 487.05). The Stillman case46 led to the en-
actment of body impression warrants (section 487.091). The Duarte 
case47 led to the enactment of participant monitoring authorizations 
(section 184.1). The Wong case48 led to the enactment of the general 
warrant which includes authorization for video surveillance (section 
487.01), and the Wise case49 led to the enactment of a tracking device 
warrant (section 492.1). In the latter example, the tracking warrant can 
be issued on the basis of “reasonable suspicion” so it can be seen that 
Parliament listened carefully to the dialogue as it lowered the objective 
criteria for the issuance of this warrant on the basis that the Court in the 
Wise case held that the expectation of privacy on vehicle movement was 
reduced (but not entirely absent).  
While these previous decisions on section 8 of the Charter effective-
ly fostered dialogue, the Tessling decision does not. Not only does the 
decision lack the catalyst for dialogue, the decision appears to be a de-
parture from the prevailing approach to privacy and it may be a signal 
for lower courts to exempt other non-intrusive technological investigato-
ry aids.50 The prior jurisprudence appeared to zealously guard privacy 
within a dwelling home and with many rhetorical flourishes the Court 
sanctified the home as sanctuary: 
It is surprising that nearly four hundred years after Semayne’s Case 
(1604), 5 Co. Rep. 91, 77 E.R. 194, there should be any debate about 
the matter. That case firmly enunciated the principle that “a man’s 
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home is his castle”, and that even the King himself had no right to 
invade the sanctity of the home without the authority of a judicially 
issued warrant. That principle has remained ever since as a bulwark 
for the protection of the individual against the state. It affords the 
individual a measure of privacy and tranquillity against the 
overwhelming power of the state; see also Entick v. Carrington 
(1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029, [95 E.R. 807]. It is a fundamental precept of a 
free society. The apparent confusion in the courts below is all the more 
disturbing since in the very statute the police were attempting to 
enforce, the Narcotic Control Act (ss.10 and 12), it is made abundantly 
clear that a police officer may only enter a dwelling “under authority 
of a warrant” issued by a justice.51 
...in the Charter era, as I will presently seek to demonstrate, the 
emphasis on privacy in Canada has gained considerable 
importance...There is no question that the common law has always 
placed a high value on the security and privacy of the 
home...Notwithstanding its prior importance, however, the legal status 
of the privacy of the home was significantly increased with the advent 
of the Charter.52 
In Tessling, the Court paid lip-service to the sanctity of the home, 
but ultimately the Court’s analysis focused on “informational privacy” 
with the location of the intrusion receding into the background. The 
Court was not concerned by the use of FLIR because the existing crude 
technology is currently incapable of revealing intimate details of activi-
ties within the home. Of course, technology grows quickly by leaps and 
bounds and the Court recognized that the FLIR technology may improve 
its capacity to detect movement and details within the home. The Court 
casually dismissed this concern noting it will cross that bridge when 
confronted with the modified technology: 
If as expected, the capability of FLIR and other technologies will 
improve the nature and quality of the information hereafter changes, it 
will be a different case, and the courts will have to deal with its 
privacy implications at that time in light of the facts as they exist.53 
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The indifference of the Court is eerily reminiscent of the casual ap-
proach of the U.S. Supreme Court to evolving technology. In the Knotts 
case, the U.S. Court was confronted with the assertion that failing to 
characterize a tracking device as a search would lead to “twenty-four 
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country...without judicial 
knowledge or supervision.” The Court’s meek response was that “if 
such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions 
should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”54  
In my submission there is no place in the world of constitutional ad-
judication for indifference. A “wait and see” attitude can eviscerate 
rights which patiently wait for vindication. This casual approach is in-
consistent with the Court’s assertion in Hunter v. Southam that there 
must be a mechanism for “preventing unjustified intrusions before they 
happen, not simply determining, after the fact, whether they ought to 
have occurred in the first place.”55 In addition, there currently exists 
some evidence to suggest that the FLIR technology may be able to un-
cover more than simple, ambiguous heat patterns. Presented with a 
different evidentiary record than in the case at bar, one judge has charac-
terized the nature of the FLIR intrusion as follows: 
[a FLIR] can detect human form through an open window when the 
person is leaning against a curtain, and pressing the curtain between 
the window screen and his or her body. [A FLIR] can also detect the 
warmth generated by a person leaning against a relatively thin barrier 
such as a plywood door. 
A FLIR allows the police: 
[t]o draw specific inferences about the inside of [a home]. When 
directed at a home, the infrared device allows the officer to 
determine which particular rooms a homeowner is heating, and 
thus using, at night. This information may reflect a homeowner’s 
financial inability to heat an entire home, the existence and 
location of energy consuming and heat producing appliances, and 
possibly even the number of people who may be staying at the 
residence on a given night. The device discloses information 
about activities occurring within the confines of a home, and 
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which a person is entitled to keep from disclosure absent a 
warrant.56 
From the Court’s perspective, the nature and scope of FLIR intru-
sion is so insignificant that it would trivialize the Charter to extend its 
protection to this investigative technique. As sensible as this logic may 
appear to be, the Court’s perspective flies in the face of an incontrovert-
ible principle established by the Court in its very first case dealing with 
section 8, Hunter v. Southam. In the context of criminal law enforce-
ment, the Court established a principle which governs the entire investi-
gative stage of the criminal process: “The State’s interest in detecting 
and preventing crime begins to prevail over the individual’s interest in 
being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces 
suspicion.”57 (emphasis added) In other words, imposing constitutional 
restrictions upon the investigative goals of law enforcement is designed 
to ensure that residents in a free society will not be monitored and in-
truded upon unless the state has reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that this resident is, has been, or will be involved in criminal 
activity.  
As stated earlier, there is good reason to believe that there has been 
an ineffective incorporation of constitutional norms within police cul-
ture, but it is hard to imagine that there could be problems incorporating 
a principle as simple and lucid as this Hunter principle. Nonetheless, it 
has to be recognized that our courts have construed the objective criteria 
of reasonable and probable grounds (the “credibly-based probability”) in 
an open-ended, discretionary fashion, and this lack of certainty may be 
contributing to the weak incorporation of constitutional norms. For 
example, the critical determination of “probable cause,” as based upon 
tips received from confidential informants, is now based upon a discre-
tionary, “totality of circumstances” approach.58 This totality of circum-
stances approach was borrowed from a U.S. Supreme Court case which 
overruled the previous bright-line approach.59 In the United States, prior 
to 1983, an informant’s tip had to meet a two-prong test in which there 
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had to be sufficient information disclosed by the police with respect to 
1) the informant’s reliability/veracity and 2) the basis of the informant’s 
information (i.e., the basis by which the informant acquired the infor-
mation). In moving to the totality of circumstances approach, the Court 
substituted a common sense approach in which no one factor would be 
necessary or sufficient. Although common sense should never be aban-
doned, it is clear that a discretionary standard operates as a much weaker 
constraint upon the police than does a bright-line standard. The two-
prong bright-line standard may have been underinclusive, and may on 
occasion have prevented a search which would have been reasonable in 
the circumstances, but it still provides far more guidance to the police 
than a discretionary standard which can only be assessed ex post facto. 
While the police are left to struggle with an objective criteria 
fraught with vagueness,60 the Tessling decision leaves the impression 
that the Court has forgotten the other part of the principle ― i.e., that 
the “individual’s interest in being left alone” is the rationale for impos-
ing objective criteria for intrusion. The essence of the rights contained in 
sections 8 and 9 of the Charter is the right to be left alone. Privacy is 
simply a cultural expression of the need, and the right, to be left alone. 
Privacy is an abstract concept and to instantiate the content of this ab-
straction it is necessary to extrapolate from the fundamental political 
postulate that liberty entails the right to be left alone unless the state has 
a compelling, overriding interest. As the Court has stated: 
This Court has most often characterized the values engaged by privacy 
in terms of liberty, or the right to be left alone by the state. For 
example, in R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at p. 427, 45 C.C.C. 
(3d) 244, 55 D.L.R. (4th) 503, La Forest J. commented that “privacy is 
at the heart of liberty in a modern state”. In R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 
S.C.R. 128, at para. 50, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, 132 D.L.R. (4th) 31, per 
Cory J., privacy was characterized as including “[t]he right to be free 
from intrusion or interference”. This interest in being left alone by the 
state includes the ability to control the dissemination of confidential 
information.61 
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When the law of search and seizure had as its primary goal the pro-
tection of property, it was fairly evident to both police and judges when 
an intrusion had taken place. When the concrete notion of property was 
replaced by the abstract notion of privacy, greater indeterminancy was 
introduced into the assessment of whether a police intrusion constituted 
a search. The evolution of the right now clearly contemplates the protec-
tion of interests which were more intangible and psycho-social in their 
nature as the clear line demarcating a property invasion has been re-
placed with a murkier line demarcating a zone of privacy where people 
can expect to be left alone.  
It cannot be gainsaid that FLIR intrusions do not reveal highly-
personal and intimate details of domestic life, but the right to be left 
alone is still violated even when the intrusion does not reveal very 
much. When the Court characterized the FLIR intrusion as not invading 
a reasonable expectation of privacy this leads to the reality that there 
will be no judicial control whatsoever over this practice. Other than 
obvious budgetary constraints, there would be no constitutional obsta-
cles for the police to engage in “twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country...without judicial knowledge or supervision.” 
Perhaps the loss of privacy may be marginal but the right to be left alone 
is shattered by unregulated police surveillance, whether technological or 
conventional. An individual’s right to security of the person is enhanced 
if the individual can retire to his or her home with the knowledge that 
the police cannot, and will not, randomly target their home for criminal 
investigation by any means. Living with the knowledge of arbitrary 
surveillance is incompatible with liberty and security. People may not 
fear the FLIR technology in particular but many people would object to 
the unregulated targeting of their dwelling homes for investigative pur-
poses.  
In previous cases, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to recog-
nize that privacy was not just a normative concept but that it should also 
be viewed as a political concept. Knowing of the impossibility of map-
ping out a determinate zone of privacy, the Court in earlier cases fo-
cused on the political question of when state power can justifiably 
intrude upon the right to be left alone. In ruling that the warrantless 
interception of private communications upon consent of one of the par-
ties was unconstitutional, the Court in Duarte noted that “if the state 
may arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no 
longer possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of the 
individual to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude upon pri-
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vacy in the furtherance of its goals....”62 Similarly, in ruling that warrant-
less video surveillance was unconstitutional the Court posed the relevant 
question in a more overtly-political manner: 
In the place of the “risk analysis”, R. v. Duarte approached the 
problem of determining whether a person had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in given circumstances by attempting to assess whether, by 
the standards of privacy that persons can expect to enjoy in a free and 
democratic society, the agents of the state were bound to conform to 
the requirements of the Charter when effecting the intrusion in 
question. This involves asking whether the persons whose privacy was 
intruded upon could legitimately claim that in the circumstances it 
should not have been open to the agents of the state to act as they did 
without prior judicial authorization.63 
In Tessling, the Court focused entirely on the informational privacy 
issue, and ignored the right to be left alone and the need to curtail ran-
dom intrusion. The Court took comfort in its earlier decision of R. v. 
Plant64 in which it held that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in hydro records. In 1993 the Court upheld the warrantless sei-
zure of hydro records (once again in search of marijuana grow-ops) on 
the basis that hydro records do not reveal personal and intimate details 
of domestic life. Since an individual’s pattern of consumption of elec-
tricity was not seen as a private detail, it is not surprising that the Court 
in Tessling would not see the privacy interest in patterns of heat emana-
tion. Superficially, there is a logical connection between the result in 
Plant and the result in Tessling, but the Court’s reliance upon Plant 
appears to be disingenuous. There is a critical distinction between seiz-
ing records already collected and compiled by the private sector and 
flying over an individual’s home to conduct a “structure profile.” Clear-
ly, a vital component of the reasoning in Plant was the fact that hydro 
records are collected as part of an ongoing commercial service and the 
records are readily available to anyone upon asking. The Court stated in 
Plant: 
The nature of the relationship between the appellant and the 
Commission cannot be characterized as a relationship of confidence. 
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The Commission prepared the records as part of an ongoing 
commercial relationship and there is no evidence that it was 
contractually bound to keep them confidential… it was clearly the 
policy of the Calgary Commission to permit police access to the 
computer data bank, albeit through a computer password. Further, it is 
generally possible for an individual to inquire with respect to the 
energy consumption at a particular address, so that this information is 
subject to inspection by members of the public at large. The 
accessibility of the information to the public is, in my view, more 
relevant to the issue than the policy of release developed by the 
Calgary Commission since the primary concern in this analysis is the 
expectation of privacy held by the person whose information was 
released rather than the manner in which the body releasing the 
information categorized it. Nevertheless, I do not view the relevant 
relationship in the case at bar as one which is reasonably characterized 
as confidential. 
The place and manner in which the information in the case at bar was 
retrieved also point toward the conclusion that the appellant held no 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the computerized 
electricity records. The police were able to obtain the information 
online by agreement of the Commission. Accessing the information 
did not involve intrusion into places ordinarily considered private, as 
was the case in Duarte, supra, and Wong, supra. Nor did it involve 
invasion by state agents in personal computer records confidentially 
maintained by a private citizen. While the requirement that the police 
use a password to access the information may suggest some element of 
privacy in the manner in which the search was conducted, it may 
equally suggest that the password was merely intended to ensure that 
on-line information was available only to the police.65 
It is ironic that in cases dealing with new technology and privacy, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has gone to great lengths to distance itself 
from the stingy approach of the American Supreme Court; whereas, on 
the question of FLIR surveillance our Court has shrugged its shoulders 
while the United States Supreme Court in 2001 ruled that this type of 
intrusion was a serious invasion of privacy.66 The importance on pre-
venting unregulated intrusions, even marginal ones, into the home was 
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not lost on the American court. It noted that “with few exceptions, the 
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence 
unconstitutional must be answered no,” and “we have said that the 
Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.” The 
American court was not moved by the argument that FLIR cannot un-
cover intimate details of activities within the home because “the fourth 
amendment protection of the home has never been tied to measurement 
of the quality or quantity of the information obtained.” As one commen-
tator has noted about the absolutist position of the American courts on 
protection of the home: 
The Court’s message seems clear. There is no informational content 
limitation on the protection afforded confidentiality in private 
dwellings. At least in home settings, the nature or amount of 
confidential information that can be revealed by a technological tool is 
irrelevant. There is neither a qualitative “intimacy” standard nor a 
quantitative “substantiality” standard that needs be met. All 
information, every fact, every detail is critical, intimate and entitled to 
the privacy protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.67 
The message of the American Supreme Court is clear but our Court 
presents law enforcement officials with an operational dilemma. Police 
must assess whether any new technology they choose to employ is ca-
pable of uncovering intimate details of activities within the home. In my 
submission, greater respect is shown for the right to be left alone when 
the judiciary treats the sanctity of the home as inviolate. The right to be 
left alone when in the home is best secured by rigid adherence to anoth-
er principle emerging from the Hunter case ― warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable. If the Court ruled that FLIR surveillance 
constituted a search presumptively requiring a warrant this would com-
pel Parliament to evaluate the situation. It could then decide whether to 
legislatively fashion a specific FLIR warrant, perhaps on a lesser stand-
ard of reasonable suspicion, or whether to require the police to obtain a 
general warrant under section 487.01 of the Criminal Code from a pro-
vincial court judge upon a standard of reasonable and probable grounds.  
By focusing entirely on the less-sacred notion of informational pri-
vacy the Supreme Court makes the right to be left alone in the home 
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contingent upon the nature of the activities within the home which can 
be captured by technological intrusion. In a surprising identity-switch, 
the Supreme Court succumbed to the allure of the American approach to 
privacy which has vested enormous discretion in law enforcement offi-
cials, and the American Court has championed our Court’s due process 
perspective that the control of police discretion is a necessary compo-
nent of a fair and just criminal process.  
III. MANN AND THE FRISK 
Tessling may be a departure from the Court’s fairly consistent pro-
tection of privacy within the home, but R. v. Mann68 appears to be con-
sistent with the Court’s fairly rigorous protection of invasions of privacy 
of the person and bodily integrity. Privacy of the person has been 
strongly protected with virtually automatic exclusion of breath and 
blood samples unreasonably seized from suspected impaired drivers69 
and with the exclusion of evidence for violations of bodily integrity 
when searching incident to arrest.70 When the Mann decision was re-
leased the media reported that the Court had placed further restrictions 
on police powers71 and it was reasonable to conclude that this decision 
was predicated on protecting the physical security of individuals 
stopped by the police for investigative detention. 
Appearances can be deceiving. In actuality, the Mann case is about 
the judicial creation of police powers. The police had a suspicion that 
Mann was involved in a break and enter. The suspicion was firmly-
grounded in the identification evidence provided to the police. The sus-
pect was frisked and then the officer located some marijuana when he 
searched the suspect’s pocket. Traditionally, the police had only two 
options in approaching a suspect ― either arrest the suspect if the suspi-
cion had crystallized into reasonable and probable grounds (and then 
search incident to arrest), or let the suspect go free and continue the 
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investigation without the suspect being detained. The traditional posi-
tion was clearly outlined by Martin J.A.: 
Although a police officer is entitled to question any person in order to 
obtain information with respect to a suspected offence, he has no 
lawful power to compel the person questioned to answer. Moreover, a 
police officer has no right to detain a person for questioning or further 
investigation. No one is entitled to impose any physical restraint upon 
the citizen except as authorized by law, and this principle applies to 
police officers as to anyone else. Although a police officer may 
approach a person on the street and ask him questions, if the person 
refuses to answer the police officer must allow him to proceed on his 
way, unless, of course, the officer arrests him....72 
Based upon the developing jurisprudence in the appellate courts, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a power of investigative detention exists when 
there are “reasonable grounds to detain” and upon this detention there 
exists a power of protective search. The protective search only extends 
to searching (by frisking) for weapons and does not include searching 
for evidence. Accordingly, the officer in Mann exceeded the scope of 
search incident to detention by searching the accused’s pocket after the 
frisk revealed a “soft” object in the pocket. The soft object could not 
conceivably be a weapon thus the officer has no authority to search the 
pocket. The Court excluded the evidence on the basis that good faith 
could not be satisfied by an officer’s unreasonable error about the scope 
of his or her authority.  
A great deal has been written about investigative detention and this 
case73 so the following analysis will be relatively brief. Although the 
power to search incident to detention was restricted to a protective pat-
down or frisk, Mann effectively expanded police powers in a manner 
not conducive to fostering dialogue with Parliament. The traditional 
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approach to police powers was one of “strict authorization”74 in which 
the police could only exercise a power specifically granted to them by 
statute or common law. In the past few decades, the Court has relied 
upon the “ancillary powers” doctrine to police powers in which the 
police possess whatever power is reasonably necessary to effect their 
duties. Instead of searching for an explicit grant of power, under this 
doctrine a court will give ex post facto approval to the exercise of a 
police power if the police conduct was within the “general scope of any 
legal duty” and if the conduct was not an “unjustifiable use of power 
associated with the duty.”75 
With respect to a power of investigative detention, in 1993, the On-
tario Court of Appeal in R. v. Simpson applied the ancillary powers 
doctrine to give birth to a power of investigative detention upon articu-
lable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Court noted: 
Especially in light of the definition of “detention” adopted in R. v. 
Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481, [45 C.R. (3d) 97] 
and R. v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 411, [63 C.R. 
(3d) 1], I have no doubt that the police detain individuals for 
investigative purposes when they have no basis to arrest them. In some 
situations the police would be regarded as derelict in their duties if 
they did not do so. I agree with Professor Young, “All Along the 
Watch Tower,” supra, at p.367 when he asserts: 
The courts must recognize the reality of investigatory detention 
and begin the process of regulating the practice so that street 
detentions do not end up being non-stationhouse incommunicado 
arrests. 
Unless and until Parliament or the Legislature acts, the common law 
and specifically the criteria formulated in Waterfeld, supra, must 
provide the means whereby the courts regulate the police power to 
detain for investigatory purposes.76 
In an earlier article of mine, All Along the Watchtower: Arbitrary 
Detention and the Police Function,77 I had asserted that unauthorized 
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investigative detention is a daily routine in Canadian policing and the 
traditional common law position simply ignored this reality. Many other 
jurisdictions have authorized brief investigative detentions78 and I had 
argued that the time had come to recognize that this investigative prac-
tice was a practical necessity which would be employed regardless of 
whether it was lawfully authorized. Ironically, the passage quoted from 
my article suggests that I was asserting that it was within the judicial 
function to create a new power of investigative detention, whereas upon 
further reading it was clear that the article was calling for a legislative 
response: 
By providing explicit authorization for the practice of investigatory 
detention, the legislatures are able to construct safeguards which may 
include the keeping of detailed registers, the provision of medical 
examinations, the notification of counsel, family, or friends, and 
various official warnings to inform the suspect of the reason for the 
detention, and the right to remain silent. The potential for abuse is not 
eliminated yet it is no small achievement for law enforcement officials 
to be compelled to transform a low-visibility practice into one of 
official regulation with stated limitations. 79 
There are a number of reasons why a power of investigative deten-
tion should be crafted by the legislature and not the judiciary.80 First, the 
ancillary powers doctrine should not be employed on a routine basis and 
should be restricted to situations of an emergency nature. An expedien-
cy test consisting of what is “reasonably necessary” in the circumstances 
provides little guidance to the police and vests far too much discretion in 
the officer. A police power should be easily ascertainable before the fact 
and not created after the fact to suit the facts of a particular case. The 
common law is an ill-suited vehicle for the creation of police powers 
because of the piecemeal nature of adjudication. The evolutionary 
common law process will rarely yield resolute and clear guidance for 
the police. Even though the Ontario Court of Appeal gave its seal of 
approval to the power of investigative detention in 1993, it took a fur-
ther 12 years before the issue was finally resolved by the Supreme Court 
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of Canada. Surprisingly, the Court denied leave to appeal in R. v. Fer-
ris81 on December 18, 1998 even though this case starkly raised the issue 
of search incident to investigative detention. For whatever reason, it 
took the Court over 10 years to resolve an issue of practical and daily 
significance for policing. 
In the 12 years it took for the Court to respond to this issue, the po-
lice were confronted with a series of legal questions with nowhere to 
turn for answers. Leslie McCoy summarized the unresolved questions 
arising from the judicial creation of a power of investigative detention: 
 
-  Should there be a general power to detain for investigative 
purposes? 
-  Is “articulable cause” an appropriate term to use to refer to the 
grounds necessary to base an investigative detention, or are the 
terms “reasonable grounds to detain” or “reasonable grounds to 
suspect” more appropriate? 
-  What is meant by a “brief” detention? 
-  Can a suspect be removed to a secondary location in the course of 
a valid investigative detention? 
-  Is it ever permissible for the police to go beyond a mere pat-down 
search during an investigative detention? 
-  What does it mean for the police to advise a detainee “in clear and 
simple language” of the reasons for his or her investigative 
detention? 
-  Do s. 10(b) Charter rights apply upon investigative detention?82 
 
Most unfortunately, the Court’s decision in Mann does not address any 
of these issues with any degree of clarity. If anything the Court muddied 
the waters by transforming the requisite grounds for detention from the 
recognized standard of “reasonable suspicion” or “articulable cause” to 
the unknown and uncertain standard of “reasonable grounds to detain.” 
Undoubtedly, it is reasonable to create a half-way house between arrest 
and liberty, as in many circumstances it would constitute a dereliction of 
duty for the police to walk away from a suspect simply because a rea-
sonable suspicion has not yet reached the level of reasonable and proba-
ble grounds for an arrest. The ancillary powers doctrine has had vibrant 
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application with respect to the exercise of powers of detention to deal 
with altercations and rapidly-developing problems in public forums. 
Without this doctrine the police would be handicapped in dealing with 
issues of crowd control83 and emergency calls for help.84 Ancillary pow-
ers complement the need for the police to respond quickly to unforeseen 
developments, but until the Mann case it had not been used to create 
new search powers. A search is not designed to defuse an emergency ― 
it is usually a carefully considered response to an ongoing investigative 
need. Without the element of immediacy being present there has been 
little need to employ ancillary powers to expand search powers. 
Historically, the courts have consistently applied the doctrine of 
“strict construction” to search powers.85 In the Supreme Court’s very 
first pronouncement on section 8 of the Charter, the Court went to 
great lengths to emphasize that the Charter “is not in itself an authori-
zation for governmental action” and that “it does not confer any pow-
ers, even of ‘reasonable’ search and seizure, on these governments.”86 
Upon declaring warrantless video surveillance to be unconstitutional, 
the Court in Wong was asked to create a new search warrant for video 
recordings. The Court categorically rejected this request to design new 
search powers: 
...the courts would be forgetting their role as guardians of our 
fundamental liberties if they were to usurp the role of Parliament and 
purport to give their sanction to video surveillance by adapting to that 
purpose a code of procedure dealing with an altogether different 
surveillance technology. It is for Parliament, and Parliament alone, to 
set out the conditions under which law enforcement agencies may 
employ video surveillance technology in their fight against crime. 
Moreover, the same hold true for any other technology which the 
progress of science places at the disposal of the state in the years to 
come. Until such time as Parliament, in its wisdom, specifically 
provides for a code of conduct for a particular invasive technology, the 
courts should forbear from crafting procedures authorizing the 
deployment of the technology in question. The role of the courts 
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should be limited to assessing the constitutionality of any legislation 
passed by Parliament which bears on the matter. 87 
In Mann the Court did not take its own sage advice to “forbear from 
crafting” search powers. In fact, the Court seemed to disregard the evi-
dence suggesting that the American approach to investigative detention 
(“stop and frisk”)88 has turned out to be unwieldy and poorly-regulated. 
Prior to the decision in Mann, one commentator implored the Court not 
to follow the American approach in having the judiciary craft the con-
tours of the powers to detain and search suspects: 
The Supreme Court of Canada should think carefully before deciding 
to endorse a judicially-created investigative detention power. If the 
American experience can teach us anything, it is that a case-by-case 
approach to the explication of police powers associated with 
investigative detention can be dangerous. It invariably takes place 
while a guilty person is before the court, evoking a strong desire to 
affirm the conduct of the police and ensure that wrongdoing is 
punished. This leads to an almost inevitable expansion of police 
authority. As one American commentator recently observed: 
Terry has not succeeded… the nature of judicial review 
contemplated ― deferential review of discretionary, low profile, 
street level decisions according to a malleable balancing standard 
― was poorly suited to achieve the desired result of creating clear 
guidelines for the use of stop and frisk... . It offered little guidance 
about what sorts of police conduct would be permissible… It 
should come as no surprise that … movement by the lower courts, 
prosecutors, police, and even the Supreme Court itself has been 
inexorably away from Terry’s narrow holding and toward 
increased police discretion… . Judicial review has not succeeded 
in controlling the widespread abuse of stop and frisk, the vast 
brunt of which falls, as it did in 1968, on minority suspects.89 
It would have been more prudent for the Court to recognize the dai-
ly reality of investigative detention but decline to give its judicial stamp 
of approval to the practice. Only by leaving this gaping hole in daily 
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investigative work would Parliament be galvanized into action to reme-
dy the shortcoming. As La Forest J. had stated in the context of police 
powers: “the duty of courts has always been to act as a brake...courts 
undoubtedly have a creative role in developing the law, but they must be 
extremely wary of widening the possibility of encroaching on our per-
sonal liberties.”90 If the Court believed it had the authority and confi-
dence to create these new powers, it was then incumbent on the Court to 
provide specific guidance on many of the unanswered questions relating 
to length of detention, right of counsel, movement of suspect to another 
location and the need to compile formal records or incident reports relat-
ing to the detention.  
It might be considered highly unorthodox for a Court to construct a 
code of police practice as this appears to stray too close to the legislative 
function. Police powers have always been viewed as a public policy 
issue requiring legislative intervention.91 However, the Court has taken 
on the role of mini-legislature in other criminal justice contexts. The 
courts have had the primary responsibility to fashion the principles 
relating to liability, fault and defences, and courts have felt a greater 
degree of comfort in setting out a mini-code to address issues which 
have been characteristically delegated by the legislature to the judiciary. 
For example, the defence of entrapment received the judicial stamp of 
approval in 1988.92 In providing the juridical foundation for this defence 
the Court established a general test and a specific list of factors to take 
into account in applying the test. The test for entrapment was framed as 
follows: 
there is entrapment when: 
(a) the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to commit 
an offence without acting on a reasonable suspicion that this 
person is already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a 
bona fide inquiry; 
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(b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the 
course of a bona fide inquiry, they go beyond providing an 
opportunity and induce the commission of an offence.
93
 
The Court then stipulated that the following factors should be assessed 
in determining if the test for entrapment has been satisfied: 
To determine whether the police have employed means which go 
further than providing an opportunity, it is useful to consider any or all 
of the following factors: 
-  the type of crime being investigated and the availability of other 
techniques for the police detection of its commission; 
-  whether an average person, with both strengths and weaknesses, 
in the position of the accused would be induced into the 
commission of a crime; 
-  the persistence and number of attempts made by the police before 
the accused agreed to committing the offence; 
-  the type of inducement used by the police, including: deceit, 
fraud, trickery or reward; 
-  the timing of the police conduct, in particular whether the police 
have instigated the offence or became involved in ongoing 
criminal activity; 
-  whether the police conduct involves an exploitation of human 
characteristics such as the emotions of compassion, sympathy and 
friendship; 
-  whether the police appear to have exploited a particular 
vulnerability of a person such as a mental handicap or a substance 
addiction; 
-  the proportionality between the police involvement, as compared 
to the accused, including an assessment of the degree of harm 
caused or risked by the police, as compared to the accused, and 
the commission of any illegal acts by the police themselves; 
-  the existence of any threats, implied or express, made to the 
accused by the police or their agents; 
-  whether the police conduct is directed at undermining other 
constitutional values.94 
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The Court’s quasi-legislative approach in the Mack case is the only 
responsible approach to be taken when the Court decides to exercise its 
creative, rather than interpretive, powers. By simply acknowledging the 
existence of the power of investigative detention and search, without 
providing concrete guidance on numerous operational issues, the Court 
in Mann has left the police in the worst of all possible worlds. The po-
lice cannot guide themselves by the general terms of the Mann case, and 
there would be little hope that Parliament would step in to resolve the 
outstanding questions. From the Parliamentary perspective the Supreme 
Court has done the job for the Parliamentarians and the legislative 
branch of government will sit back and leave the details to be worked by 
the evolution of the common law. Mann is a dead-end decision and 
while judges and police officers struggle to emerge from the cul-de-sac 
there will remain a great deal of uncertainty about the rights of individu-
als and the powers of police whenever an investigative detention is 
undertaken.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
On January 8, 2005 the front-page of the Globe and Mail newspaper 
reported that “a long rancorous debate over judicial activism has waned 
thanks to a growing, understanding that judges sometimes have no 
choice but to strike down laws, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin says”. 
No doubt Canadians have grown accustomed to judges wielding politi-
cal power through constitutional decisionmaking, and many of the 
standard political objections to non-elected officials exercising political 
power have grown tiresome and irrelevant. However, the way in which 
the Tessling and Mann cases chill further dialogue between court and 
legislature may give rise to a new debate about judicial inactivity rather 
than judicial activism. A proper understanding of activism would dictate 
that the Supreme Court of Canada should seize the available opportuni-
ties to clarify the boundaries of police power and not issue narrow rul-
ings under the guise of allowing the power to evolve incrementally 
under the common law. 
It is not surprising that there has been poor incorporation of consti-
tutional norms within police culture when the Supreme Court issues 
decisions which raise more questions than they answer. When it comes 
to novel technology and the home, it is unfair to require an officer to 
make the determination of whether to obtain a warrant on the basis of 
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whether this technology can capture intimate details. As in 1993, it is 
best to leave the question of police empowerment through new technol-
ogy for Parliament and if, and when, Parliament determines that it wants 
to add a particular, invasive technology to the police arsenal, the Court 
can review the power to determine if it comports with the Constitution.  
When it comes to street detentions, it is unfair to require the police 
to decipher the relationship between reasonable grounds to detain, rea-
sonable grounds to suspect and reasonable and probable grounds. If the 
Court cannot provide sufficient guidance in creating new powers for 
state officials, it should decline to do so and in taking no action it can 
compel Parliament to address the issue in a comprehensive manner. 
Creating new police powers without attempting to address the issue in a 
comprehensive manner is judicial activism gone awry.  
Tessling and Mills both vest enormous discretion in the police. Dis-
cretion may be indispensable for the proper administration of criminal 
justice but unconstrained discretion can subvert the very foundation of 
justice. The Supreme Court has made a mistake in allowing the police to 
randomly target a home for infra-red imaging. The Supreme Court also 
made a mistake in approving of the powers of investigative detention 
and search incident to this detention without providing clear guidance as 
to the parameters of this “brief” intrusion. There is something about 
these two cases which lends itself to making mistakes. Lost in the midst 
of the legal debate, it is easy to forget that the police made mistakes in 
both cases. Mann was not the suspected burglar and Tessling was not 
the suspected marijuana grower.95 
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